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INTRODUCTION

The accomplishment of justice should not be the fortuitous residue of the
process in which the prosecutorparticipates;it should be the guiding principle for every aspect of the prosecutorialfunction.1

As the only attorneys charged with seeking justice, 2 prosecutors
play an important role and carry a unique burden in our justice system.3 They are administrators of justice, 4 representing a sovereign
whose interest "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."15 As Robert H. Jackson explained to a group of U.S. Attorneys
over sixty years ago, "the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who
tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims,
who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches
his task with humility."'6
When Deputy Attorney GeneralJames Comey7 was the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, he would tell every new
prosecutor: "Don't you ever say something you don't completely believe. I'm not even talking about shades of gray. If you don't 100
1

Kenneth J. Melilli, ProsecutorialDiscretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV.

669, 702. Melilli was a prosecutor for five years, three and a half of which were as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia. Id. at 669 n.1.
2 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
3 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Prosecutoria!Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 727 (1999) (
[T]he ethical rules that govern the legal profession single out prosecutors
as the only participants who must adhere to a special duty beyond that of
representing zealously their "client." This higher duty has been variously
phrased to require the prosecutor "to seek justice, not merely to convict,"
and "to serve as a minister ofjustice and not simply [as] an advocate."
(citations omitted) (second alteration in original)). But see William H. Simon, EthicalDiscretion in Laryermng, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1090-91 (1988) (proposing that other attorneys should also "seek justice," adopting "a style of ethical judgment for private lawyers
analogous to that familiarly associated with judges or prosecutors").
4 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRAION OF CRIMINALJUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTiON § 3-1.2(b) (1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], available at http://

www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc-toc.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
5 See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
6 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 Am. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6
(1940-41).
7 See A] Kamen, One Show Turkey and a Lot of Fowl, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2003, at A29;
Siobhan Roth & Vanessa Blum, Summoned to Main Justice at Time of Exodus, Scrutiny, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 7, 2003, at 1. Comey has a "reputation[ ] for placing high value on prosecutorial
integrity." Gary Fields & Greg Hitt, Ashcroft Gives Up Role in Inquiry into CIA Leak, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 31, 2003, at A4.
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percent believe it, don't you dare say it. That's why being a prosecutor is so great: You don't have to make arguments you don't believe
in."" He told law students interning at the Southern District of New
York that he could "hire smart all day," but that intelligence alone was
not enough. 9 Because prosecutors have the ability to ruin lives, he
explained, he looked for people who could exercise this power with
discretion and sensitivity.1 c
A few weeks later, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft stripped
the discretion that federal prosecutors need to do justice."1 In a memorandum to all federal prosecutors, Ashcroft directed them to "charge
and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that
12
are supported by the facts of the case" with limited exceptions. Furthermore, the Attorney General instructed that a prosecutor "must
not request or accede to a downward departure except in the limited
circumstances specified in [the] memorandum" unless the attorney
received permission from her superior.' 3
Almost immediately, former Attorney General Janet Reno spoke
against Ashcroft's leap towards harsh uniformity: "To see that justice is
done, there has got to be the ability to focus on what's the right thing
to do in a particular case, and the right thing to do may not be the
ultimate charge. 'q14 And while a spokesman for Comey suggested that
"'[t]here [was] no real deviation from the Southern District's longstanding policy"'1 5 regarding charging offenses, the missive from
Washington seemed likely to hinder the discretion that he suggested
was a key component of the federal prosecutor's job. The Ashcroft
Memorandum could easily force a prosecutor to "make arguments
[she doesn't] believe in."' 6
This Note examines the various ethical considerations that guide
prosecutors in exercising their discretion and the ways in which the
8
Chris Smith, Mr. Comey Goes to Washington, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 20, 2003, available at
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/politics/n 9353/index.html (last visited
Mar. 19, 2004).
9
Deputy Attorney General James Comey, Address at U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York Luncheon (July 22, 2003) (attended by the author).

to

See id.

See Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft Limiting Prosecutors' Use of Plea Bargains,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2003, at Al.
12 Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All Federal Prosecutors 2
(Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft92203.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) and http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
13
See id. at 6.
14 John Hanna, Reno Criticizes PatriotAct, Ashcroft on Prosecutors'Discretion, ASSOCIxATED
PREss NEwSwIIrs, Sept. 23, 2003, at Westlaw, 9/23/03 APWIRES 19:50:28.
15 David Hechler, Some See Little Change, Others a Mired System, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29,
2003, at 25 (quoting spokesman for James Comey).
16 See Smith, supra note 8.
'1
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Ashcroft Memorandum curtails that discretion.1 7 The goal is to evaluate the extent to which abiding by the Ashcroft Memorandum's requirements may force a prosecutor to behave unethically.'8 Part L.A
surveys prosecutorial discretion as conceived by the common law,
courts, and commentators. Part LB examines prosecutorial discretion
as described by the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, the American Bar Association's Standards for CriminalJustice Relating to the Prosecution Function, and the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 19 Part I.C then analyzes former Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh's failed attempt to exempt federal prosecutors from ethical requirements. Part IL.A evaluates the mandates of the Ashcroft
Memorandum and considers whether a prosecutor is able to fulfill
her20 ethical obligations given the circumscription of her decisionmaking powers. Part II.B examines the differences between the guidelines set forth by Attorney General Thornburgh and the Ashcroft
17
Rather than suggesting that unfettered discretion is an intrinsic "good" in the administration of justice, this Note addresses only the potential tension between prosecutors'
ethical guidelines and a system that affords them little discretion. For a critique of the
dangers of too much discretion, see James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1523 (1981), which describes the scope of prosecutorial power at
that time as "both inconsistent with the fair and effective administration of justice and
unnecessary to serve the purposes offered to justify it." For an analysis of reckless and
discriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Amercan
Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOwA L. RFv. 393, 408, 438
(2001), which suggests that "[o]rdinary prosecutors have the same power and discretion
afforded [Whitewater Independent Counsel] Kenneth Starr" and that "[tlhe breadth of
prosecutorial discretion and the prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct demonstrate the
importance of effective mechanisms of accountability."
18 At the same time, prosecutors should not simply be "'free to follow their own
lights'" in every case. See David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal
Guideline Sentencing,74 WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 889 (1996) (quotingJanet Reno's reply to Senator Hatch; for further explanation see infra note 167). Instead, a prosecutor should be
permitted to recognize and weigh the mitigating factors of each case. Most cases would
likely result in the prosecutor choosing to pursue the "most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case," which is not inconsistent with
the Ashcroft Memorandum's requirements. See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at
2. As "most of the safeguards of our legal system exist for atypical cases," the fact that these
"outlier" cases might call for decisions more nuanced than those permitted by the letter of
the Ashcroft Memorandum should not be dismissed. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof
Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 901, 905 (1991).
19 Peter Krug explained where the "forms in which written criteria" for prosecutorial
discretion were available; he also discussed legislative guidelines, which this Note will not
address. See Peter Krug, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Its Limits, 50 Am.J. COMP. L. 643,
650-652 (2002). As "[t]he rules state courts develop... are largely based on the American
Bar Association's templates[,] the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct," most, if not all, federal prosecutors must abide by
some version of one of these two ethical guidelines. Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation
ofProsecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 3441, 3443 (1999) (footnotes omitted); see also infra Part
I.C (describing a congressional mandate instructing federal prosecutors to abide by the
ethical requirements of the jurisdictions in which they practice).
20
Throughout this Note, I will refer to the prosecutor as female and the defendant or
his attorney as male.
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Memorandum. 2 1 Parts III.A and III.B consider the Ashcroft Memorandum's requirements that prosecutors charge and pursue the most serious offense and oppose downward departures, and conclude that the
Memorandum will, in some circumstances, force prosecutors to
choose between abiding by the Memorandum's requirements and fulfilling their ethical obligations. Next, Parts III.C and III.D address arguments that justice requires uniformity among all similar crimes
regardless of the defendant's culpability. Finally, Part III.E considers
whether the concerns in this Note will be obviated if Blakely v. Washington and its progeny invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
and concludes that, regardless of the sentencing scheme, prosecutors
must be afforded sufficient discretion to fulfill their ethical mandate
to "seek justice."
I
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

In some cases, the application of the criminal laws to a particularindividual, though supported by probable cause, is unwarrantedin light of the individual's lack of culpability. The prosecutor must recognize when the
circumstances of a person's situation are such that prosecution would "do
more harm than good. "22

A.

Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Common Law

The duty to seekjustice is the "long-understood role of the prosecutor in every jurisdiction"2 3 and is realized by prosecutors with "the
power to criminally charge." 24 Prosecutors' authority to charge is governed by the Constitution, statutes, and court opinions. While prosecutors have exclusive authority to prosecute, they are not generally
required to do so in every case.2 5 Prosecutorial discretion is not unlimited, but rather is constrained by "norms of equality and rationality
that are difficult to enforce in the courts."2 6 Violations of these norms
include discriminatory prosecution and complete nonenforcement of
21

This comparison is necessary to briefly rebut claims that the Ashcroft Memoran-

dum is "largely a restatement of the policy issued 14 years ago by then-Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh." Mark Corallo, Director of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice,
Letter to the Editor, Ashcrofl is Obligated to Seek Uniformity, CINCINNATI Posr, Nov. 6, 2003, at
19A.
22
§ 5.3(a)

HARRY I. SUBIN
(1992)

ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE

(citing WAYNE R.

IAFAvE & JEROLD

H.

ISRAEL, CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

§ 13.1(c) (1985)).
23 United States ex rel. Green v. Peters, Nos. 93 C 7300, 93 C 5671, 93 C 5672, 93 C
5673, 1994 WL 8258, at *6 n.3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 1994).
24 People v. O'Neill, 379 N.Y.S.2d 244, 249 (1975).
25
See ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY- PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
THE GuILTY PLEA 9 (1981)

26

Id. at 11.

(citation omitted).
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a category of crime. 27 Problems of proof often defeat defendants'
charges of discriminatory prosecution, however, and victims have difficulty obtaining standing to compel prosecution or proving that a prosecutor has engaged in total nonenforcement of a particular crime.28
Thus, prosecutors face many occasions to exercise their discretion 29 and have traditionally enjoyed great deference in wielding that
discretion. In fact, prosecutors often determine which persons should
be investigated; often choose the methods of investigation and what
information to seek as evidence; decide whom to charge with what
(and on what terms)
offense; whom to use as witnesses; and whether 30
to enter into plea bargains and grant immunity.
When deciding whether to prosecute a person, prosecutors traditionally weighed factors such as the role he played in and his motivations for entering into a criminal venture, as well as his background,
criminal history, and the specific circumstances surrounding the violation. 3' Government interests also traditionally played a role in prosecutors' charging decisions. For example, the willingness of the
accused to assist the prosecutor in building cases against others could
lead to dismissal or reduction of the charges if the governmental interest in successfully prosecuting others outweighed the interest in
convicting the accused. 32 Other factors, such as the impact of the offense on the victim and the community, the relative importance of the
case, and the public attitude about the prosecution could also affect
33
the prosecutor's charging decision.
In colonial days and through the 1800s a "prosecutor had unlimited discretion to enter a nolle prosequi3M without any court involvement. '"' The nolle was inherited from sixteenth century England,
where the Attorney General would use it to rein in a private prosecutor's frivolous or unsubstantiated charges, as well as meritorious
charges that interfered with a state prosecution. 36 The nearest ana27

See id, at 9-10.

28

Id.

29

S.A. 481 U.S. 787, 813 (1987).
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
Id. at 807.
See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 22, §§ 5.3(a), 5.4(a).
See ia § 5.3(c) (citation omitted).

30

31
32

33
34

Id.

"To be unwilling to prosecute."
State v. Mucci, 782 N.E.2d 133, 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (explaining further that
"the legislators and courts of this state and the federal government have acted to take this
unlimited postindictment discretion away from the prosecutor"); see alsoIn reRichards, 213
F.3d 773, 782 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Absent a controlling statute or rule to the contrary, this
power [to enter a nolle prosequil resides solely in the prosecutor's hands until the impanelment and swearing of a jury."); cf. State v. Sonneland, 494 P.2d 469, 471 (Wash. 1972)
(holding that a statute abrogated the discretion to dismiss a prosecution that a prosecuting
attorney traditionally enjoyed at common law).
36
See GoLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 12.
35
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logue to the nolle in the contemporary federal system is Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 48(a), which permits the Attorney General to
dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint by leave of the trial
judge, who often requires that the government provide some rationale for the dismissal request.37 On the other hand, some commentators and judges suggest that courts have no power to force continued
prosecution of cases that prosecutors do not believe warrant prosecution-including cases where the prosecutor does not believe she can
prove the charges at trial. 38 This suggests a functional return to the
traditional discretion afforded by nolle prosequi.
B.

Modern Standards and Rules Governing Prosecutorial
Discretion
1.

U.S. Attorneys' Manual Section 9-27: Principlesof Federal
Prosecution

Guidelines promulgated by the Department of Justice in the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual (Manual) suggest that prosecutors enjoy "broad
discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions
by accepting guilty pleas ...,,39 The Manual offers suggestions meant
to "provid[e] guidance rather than to mandat[e] results"' 40 and is intended to assure the public and individual defendants that prosecutors will make decisions "rationally and objectively on the merits of
each case." 4' Recognizing that the system's success hinges upon "the
character, integrity, sensitivity, and competence of those men and women who are selected to represent the public interest in the Federal
37

See d. at 17-19.

38

See id. at 20.

39

U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, U.S. A--roRNEYs' MANUAL

§ 9-27.110

cmt [hereinafter MAN-

UAL], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_readingroom/usam/tifle9/
27mcrm.htm (updated Aug. 2000). The Manual discusses the factors prosecutors should
consider in deciding whether to prosecute a case:
The manner in which Federal prosecutors exercise their decision-making
authority has far-reaching implications, both in terms of justice and effectiveness in law enforcement and in terms of the consequences for individual citizens. A determination to prosecute represents a policy judgment
that the fundamental interests of society require the application of the
criminal laws to a particular set of circumstances-recognizing both that
serious violations of Federal law must be prosecuted, and that prosecution
entails profound consequences for the accused and the family of the accused whether or not a conviction ultimately results. Other prosecutorial
decisions can be equally significant. Decisions, for example, regarding the
specific charges to be brought, or concerning plea dispositions, effectively
determine the range of sanctions that may be imposed for criminal
conduct.
Id. § 9-27.001.
40
Id.
41
Id.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:237

criminal justice process, '42 the Manual explains that "the prosecutor
has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether
to prosecute for apparent violations of Federal criminal law." 4The Manual further explains that all federal prosecutors should
"be guided by a general statement of principles that summarizes appropriate considerations to be weighed, and desirable practices to be fol44
Also, "it
lowed, in discharging their prosecutorial responsibilities."
is not intended that reference to these principles will require a particular prosecutorial decision in any given case," but rather that the Manual will help prosecutors determine how best to exercise their
authority while performing their duties. 45 Toward this end, the Manual offers federal prosecutors guidelines to help them determine
whether to file charges against an accused.
Probable cause that the accused committed the charged crime is
an absolute prerequisite to filing charges. 46 Federal prosecutors
should consider several additional factors when determining whether
to initiate prosecution, including whether a substantial federal interest is served by prosecuting, whether another jurisdiction would effectively prosecute, and whether an "adequate non-criminal alternative to
47
prosecution" is available.
Considerations relevant to ensuring that an adequate federal interest exists to prosecute include: priorities of federal law enforcement; the deterrent effects of prosecuting the accused; the nature and
seriousness of the crime; the criminal history of the accused, his individual culpability and his willingness to cooperate in other investigations or prosecutions; and "[t]he probable sentence or other
48
consequences if the person is convicted."
42

43
44

Id.
Id. § 9-27.110 cmt.
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore,
[a] Ithough these principles deal with the specific situations indicated, they
should be read in the broader context of the basic responsibilities of Federal attorneys: making certain that the general purposes of the criminal
law-assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence of further criminal
conduct, protection of the public from dangerous offenders, and rehabilitation of offenders-are adequately met, while making certain also that the
rights of individuals are scrupulously protected.

Id.
Id. § 9-27.120 cmt.
Id. § 9-27.200 cmt.
47
Id. § 9-27.220.
48 Id. § 9-27.230. Regarding culpability, the comment clarifies that "[i]f for example,
the person was a relatively minor participant in a criminal enterprise conducted by others,
or his/her motive was worthy, and no other circumstances require prosecution, the prosecutor might reasonably conclude that some course other than prosecution would be appropriate." Id. § 9-27.230 cmt. 4. The comment also adds another consideration, "The
Person's Personal Circumstances," which permits prosecutors deciding whether to bring
45

46
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To assess whether another jurisdiction can effectively prosecute
the accused, a prosecutor should consider whether the other jurisdiction has a strong interest in prosecuting, its willingness to effectively
prosecute, and the likely sentence it will give the accuser if he is convicted. 49 A prosecutor may decline to pursue criminal charges where
noncriminal sanctions adequately reflect the culpability of the accused and are likely to be imposed, and the effect of the noncriminal
disposition does not militate against federal law enforcement interests. 50 These noncriminal dispositions include subjecting the defendant to civil or administrative remedies or assigning him to a pretrial
diversion program. 51
When deciding whether to bring charges, prosecutors may not
discriminate on the basis of the race, religion, beliefs, sex, national
origin, or political affiliation of an accused, except when these characteristics are a defined element of the crime. 52 For instance, the race
of the offender and his victim might be appropriate considerations in
determining whether to prosecute a civil rights violation.5 Finally,
the prosecutor cannot consider her personal feelings about the accused, the victim, or the acquaintances of the accused, or the effect of
54
To enprosecuting on the attorney's personal or professional life.
sure that any such inappropriate considerations do not affect prosecutors' charging decisions, they must record their reasons to prosecute
55
or to decline prosecution.
While prosecutors "should resist" departures forbidden by the
Sentencing Guidelines, the Manual does not require them to oppose
56
Prosecutors should make
departures that the guidelines permit.
sentencing recommendations when required to do so by the terms of
a plea agreement or in "unusual cases" where there is "good reason to
charges to consider the age and health of the accused as potential mitigating factors, or the
person's abuse of a position of trust as a potential aggravating factor. Id. § 9-27.230 cmt. 7.
49
Id. § 9-27.240.
50
See id. § 9-27.250.
51 Pretrial diversion programs "divert certain offenders from traditional criminal justice processing into a program of supervision and services administered by the U.S. Probation Service." Id. § 9-22.000.
52
Id. § 9-27.260.
53
See id. § 9-27.260 cmt.
54 Id. § 9-27-260 cmt.
55
See id. § 9-27.270. A prosecutor's reasons to prosecute or decline prosecuting, however, are not generally discoverable. To prove selective prosecution, a defendant must
show that the prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). To gain
access to the files necessary to prove the discriminatory purpose,. the defendant must first
present "'some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of' a selective prosecution claim," or make "a credible showing of different treatment of similarly
situated persons." Id. at 470 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.
1974)).
56 See id. § 9-27.745.
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anticipate the imposition of a sanction that would be unfair to the
defendant or inadequate in terms of society's needs. . . ."57 In such a
case, the "public interest warrants an expression of the government's
view concerning the appropriate sentence. 58 1 Thus, even if the court
has not asked for her opinion, a prosecutor might either recommend
probation where "imprisonment plainly would be inappropriate" or
recommend imprisonment rather than probation if that would be the
more appropriate punishment. 59 Prosecutors must bear in mind,
however, that the "primary responsibility for sentencing lies with the
judiciary," and, therefore, they should not routinely make sentencing
60
recommendations.
One provision in the Manual suggests the degree to which the
Ashcroft Memorandum represents a departure from the discretion
historically afforded local U.S. Attorneys: "Although these materials
are designed to promote consistency in the application of Federal
criminal laws, they are not intended to produce rigid uniformity among
Federal prosecutors in all areas of the country at the expense of the fair
administrationofjustice."61 This language mirrors Robert H. Jackson's
1940 exhortations to the U.S. Attorneys assembled in the Great Hall
62
of the Department of Justice:
Your responsibility in your several districts for law enforcement and
for its methods cannot be wholly surrendered to Washington, and
ought not to be assumed by a centralized Department ofJustice. It
is an unusual and rare instance in which the local District Attorney
should be superseded in the handling of litigation, except where he
63
requests help of Washington.
2.

Model Standards: ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice Relating to
the ProsecutionFunction

The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function 64 (ABA Standards) also implicate
Id. § 9-27.730 cmt.
Id. § 9-27.730.
Id. § 9-27.730 cmt.
60
Id. But see United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR. A. 01-10469WGY, CR. A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101, at *32-33 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (suggesting prosecutors have "effective control over criminal sentencing").
61
Id. § 9-27.140 cmt. (emphasis added). A "coordinated prosecutive response" is,
however, necessary when prosecuting terrorism matters. Id. § 9-2.136. The Manual further
provides that "[i]n situations in which a modification or departure is contemplated as a
matter of policy or regular practice, the appropriate Assistant Attorney General and the
Deputy Attorney General must approve the action before it is adopted." The text most
likely addresses "fast-track" programs. See, e.g.,
infra note 139; infra Part 1II.D.
62 Larry D. Thompson & Elizabeth BarryJohnson, Money Laundering: Business Beware,
44 AtA. L. REv. 703, 722 (1993).
63
Jackson, supra note 6, at 3-4.
64 ABA STArlDARDs, supra note 4.
57
58
59
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broad discretion for prosecutors in their charging decisions. While
the Department ofJustice has not adopted the ABA Standards as official policy, the Manual recognizes that courts look to them to determine prosecutors' ethical obligations and recommends that
prosecutors become familiar with them.65 The ABA Standards describe prosecutors as "administator[s] of justice," "advocate [s]," and
"officer[s] of the court," 66 and emphasize that "the duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. '67 They also encourage
prosecutors to be reformers, actively working to remedy "inadequacies
or injustices in the substantive or procedural law." 68 Furthermore,
prosecutors are subject to the laws, ethical codes, and traditions gov69
erning their jurisdictions.
Moreover, the ABA Standards recommend that prosecutors' offices promulgate "general policies to guide the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion" so as to "achieve a fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of the criminal law."' 70 According to the ABA Standards, prosecutors should not misrepresent factual or legal matters to
the court,7 1 and have an affirmative obligation to disclose legal authority that they know is "directly adverse" to their position if defense
72
counsel has not already made the tribunal aware of such authority.
The ABA Standards additionally suggest that the prosecutor consult with victims before deciding whether to prosecute the accused,
pursue a plea bargain, or dismiss charges already filed against the defendant. 7 Nevertheless, the prosecutor retains the initial and primary
responsibility to decide whether to institute criminal proceedings
against a defendant.7 4 In making this decision, she should consider
available noncriminal dispositions even if there is probable cause to
press criminal charges-particularly if the defendant is a first-time offender and the offense is minor. 75 Even when the prosecutor chooses
supra note 39, § 9-2.101.

65

See

66
67

Id. § 3-1.2(b).
Id. § 3-1.2(c).

68

Id. § 3-1.2(d).

69
70

See id. § 3-1.2(e); see also infra Part I.C.

72

Id. § 3-2.8(d).

73

See id. § 3-3.2(h).
Id. § 3-3.4(a).
See id. § 3-3.8(a).

MANUAL,

Id. § 3-2.5(a). Compare Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, to Federal Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 1 FED. SENT. REP. 421 (1989)
[hereinafter Thornburgh Memorandum] (describing the guidelines for prosecutors as
necessary to "make sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act fair, honest, and appropriate"), available at 1989 'AT 258729, with Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12 (describing
the Thornburgh Memo as ensuring "principles of equity, fairness and uniformity" and concluding that " [flundamental fairness requires that all defendants prosecuted in the federal
criminal justice system be subject to the same standards and treated in a consistent
manner").
71
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-2.8(a).

74
75
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to bring charges, however, she "is not obliged to present all charges
which the evidence might support."76 Factors she should consider in
exercising this discretion include "the disproportion of the authorized
77
punishment in relation to the particular offense or the offender,"
her reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, 78 and the
amount of harm caused by the offense. 79 The prosecutor should not
bring more or greater charges "than can reasonably be supported with
evidence at trial or than are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the
offense."8 0 Furthermore, supervisors should not compel prosecution
8
when there is reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused. ' Finally, the ABA Standards encourage prosecutors to make themselves
a general
available for individual plea discussions, and to announce
8 2
bargains.
plea
though
charges
of
dispose
to
willingness
Once at trial, the prosecutor has a duty as an officer of the court
to "strict[ly] adher[e] to codes of professionalism."8 If the defendant
is convicted, "[t]he prosecutor should not make the severity of
4
In addition, she
sentences the index of . . . her effectiveness."8
should provide the court with any information relevant to the sentence for the presentence report8 5 and inform the court and defense
counsel of all unprivileged mitigating information of which she is
aware, either at or before sentencing.8 6 If the prosecutor chooses to
comment on the sentence, "she should seek to assure that a fair and
informed judgment is made on the sentence and to avoid unfair sen87
tence disparities."
Ethical Rules

3.
a.

ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize that prosecutors are not only advocates, but also "minister[s] ofjustice" with a responsibility to ensure that the defendant receives "procedural justice"
76

See id. § 3-3,9(b).

Id. § 3-3.9(b) (iii).
See id. § 3-3.9(b)(i).
79 See id. § 3-3.9(b) (ii). Other factors the prosecutor should consider include the motives of the complainant, the victim's willingness to testify, the defendant's cooperation in
apprehending or convcting others, and the possibility of prosecution in another jurisdiction. See id. § 3-3.9(b)(iv)-(vii).
Id. § 3-3.9(f).
80
Id. § 3-3.9(c).
81
See id. § 3-4.1(a)..
82
d. § 3-5.2(a).
83
Id. § 3-6.1(a).
84
Id. § 3-6.2(a).
85
86 Id. § 3-6.2(b).
Id. § 3-6.1(a).
87
77
78
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and that sufficient evidence supports a guilty verdict. 88 While responsibility may differ by jurisdiction, many states have adopted the ABA
Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function. 9
Thus, prosecutors must refrain from prosecuting charges not supported by probable cause,90 disclose all evidence negating the defendant's guilt or mitigating the offense, and provide all unprivileged
mitigating information to both the court and defense counsel at sentencing. 9 1 Furthermore, as with all lawyers, if a prosecutor "knows
that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client
92
regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer's conduct."
b.

ABA Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility sets aspirational standards called "Ethical Considerations" and binding "Disciplinary Rules."93 The Code recognizes that "It]he responsibilities of a
lawyer may vary" depending on the particular obligations she may
have, including those stemming from "service as a public
prosecutor."94
88

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2001)

[hereinafter MODEL

RULES].

89
90

See id.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 88, R. 3.8(a).

91 See id. R.3.8(d). Other prosecutorial responsibilities include "mak[ing] reasonable
efforts to assure" that the defendant knows he has the right to counsel and has been given
the opportunity to obtain counsel. Id.R. 3.8(b). The Rules also require prosecutors to
refrain from seeking a waiver of important pretrial rights from an unrepresented defendant, avoid subpoenaing lawyers regarding client behavior except in certain circumstances,
and refrain from making extrajudicial comments that might prejudice the defendant. See
id. R. 3.8(c), (e), (f).
92
See id. R. 1.2(e); cf MODEL RULES, supranote 88, R. 1.2 (abrogating Rule 1.2(e) and,
instead, instructing in Rule 1.4(a)(5) that "[a] lawyer shall consult with the client about
any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law"). A
government attorney's client may be "an agency official, the agency itself, the government
as a whole, or the 'public interest."' CatherineJ. I.anctot, 1"he
Duty oJZealous Advocacy and
the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. Rav. 951,
955 (1991).
93
See Frank S. Bloch et al., Fillingin the 'LargerPuzzle': ClinicalScholarship in the Wake of
The Lawyering Process, 10 CLINICAL L. Rv.221, 228 n.25 (2003) (explaining that attorneys "'were supposed to strive to follow the ethical considerations, but they were not considered binding'" (quoting JOHN S. DzIENKOWSKu, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS,
RULES AND STATUTES: 2003-04 ABRIDGED ED. 553 (2003))).
But see, e.g.,
FreeportMcMoRAN Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(invoking Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-14 to scold a government civil
lawyer who suggested that the government lawyers had no obligations beyond those of
private attorneys).
94
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrry EC 7-11 (1981) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
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The Ethical Considerations state that a prosecutor's "duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict. '' 9 5 Similarly, a lawyer's duty to represent her client zealously does not diminish her obligation to "avoid
the infliction of needless harm" and treat others involved in the legal
process with respect.96 Thus, she should use restraint when exercising
discretionary powers97 and "refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair."9 1 If a prosecutor has no discretionary
power, she should recommend against continuing unfair litigation. 99
The Disciplinary Rules constrain a prosecutor's discretion in less
ambitious-but more prescriptive-terms and require a prosecutor
not to institute charges when she "knows or it is obvious that the
charges are not supported by probable cause."'100 Furthermore, she
must disclose to the defendant or defense counsel any exculpatory
evidence and any evidence that mitigates the degree of the offense or
lessens the defendant's punishment. 10 1
Finally, ABA Model Code Ethical Considerations counsel lawyers
to strive to improve the legal system. 10 2 Because laws should be 'just,
understandable, and responsive to the needs of society,"'10 lawyers
should participate in the legislative process to improve the system
"without regard to the general interests and desires of clients or for04
mer clients."
C.

The Attorney General Cannot Exempt Federal Prosecutors
from Ethical Requirements

In a 1989 memorandum, Attorney General Thornburgh insisted
that to protect federal interests he needed the power to exempt federal prosecutors from certain rules. 10 5 He thus instructed that
subordinate federal prosecutors were exempt from "local and state
rules ... [that] frustrate the lawful operation of the federal government. " 106 Most federal courts disagreed, however, holding that the
memorandum did not shield federal prosecutors from state and local
95

Id. EC 7-13.

96

Id. EC 7-10.

97

See id.
Id. EC 7-14.
Id.

98
99
100
1o
102

Id. DR 7-103(A).
Id. DR 7-103(B).
See id. EC 8-1-8-9.

to03 Id. EC
104

8-2.

Id. EC 8-1.

105
Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, to All Justice Department Litigators (June 8, 1989), reprintedas Exhibit E in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489-93
(D.N.M. 1992).
106 See id.
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ethics requirements. 10 7 Congress sided with the courts and responded to the memorandum, and a similar regulation later promulgated under Attorney General Reno, by passing the McDade
Amendment,10 8 which expressly subjects federal prosecutors to the
ethics rules of every jurisdiction in which they practice, absent specific
authorization from Congress. 10 9 Before the McDade Amendment,
prosecutors were governed only by the ethics rules of the jurisdiction
in which they were licensed.110
Congress has since considered scaling back the McDade Amendment, t"1 and some commentators have criticized the amendment for
ignoring legitimate federalism concerns and exacerbating confusion
about inconsistent state and federal ethics rules. 1 2 The amendment
nevertheless remains in force and courts still hold federal prosecutors
to the rules of professional responsibility governing the state(s) in
which they practice as well as the state(s) in which they are licensed.113 For example, in United States v. Parker,;"4 a federal district
court looked to ethical opinions written by the New York bar to hold
that the prosecutor did not violate the rules of professional responsi15
bility by permitting audio and visual surveillance of the defendant.'
The McDade Amendment demonstrates clear congressional intent that federal prosecutors abide by the same ethical standards to
which their state analogs are held. Furthermore, the McDade Amendment-as well as the pre-McDade cases construing Thornburgh's
memorandum-suggests that an attorney general cannot exempt federal prosecutors from ethical requirements.
107

See Note, FederalProsecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amendment, 113

HARV. L. Rev. 2080, 2088 (2000).

108 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-118-2681-119 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 530B (2000)); see Note, Federal Prosecutors,supra note 107, at 2080. Attorney General Janet Reno also tried to exempt federal prosecutors from state ethics rules. See New York
State Bar Ass'n v. F.T.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 110, 132-33 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining the "Reno
Regulation" and describing the McDade Amendment as enacted "in the face of the Justice
Department's repeated attempts to exclude its attorneys from compliance with state bar
rules").
109
SeePub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-118, 2681-118 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§530B(a) (2000)).
1 10
See Note, FederalProsecutors, supra note 107, at 2080.
111 See S. 22 108th Cong. (2003) (changing the name of § 530B from "Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government" to "Professional standards for Government attorneys," and clarifying choice of law issues regarding which jurisdiction's ethical guidelines
would govern a government attorney).
112
For a critique of the McDade Amendment, see Note, Federal Prosecutors, supra note
107, at 2096-97.
11 .
See United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that a
federal prosecutor was bound by the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct).
114
165 F. Supp. 2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
115
See id. at 476 (construing MODEL CODE, supra note 94, DR 1-102(A) (4)).
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Admittedly, the prosecutorial duty to "seek justice" is more abstract than, for instance, a requirement forbidding attorneys from
contacting parties already represented by another lawyer.' 16 Moreover, a prosecutor who falls short in "seeking justice" will not likely face
disciplinary proceedings, nor is it likely that a defendant could obtain
standing to challenge a prosecutor's discretionary decision.1 7 Nevertheless, lawyers-particularly prosecutors-should hold themselves to
standards higher than the minimum necessary to avoid disciplinary
action. 18
II
THE ASHCROFT MEMORANDUM

A.

The Terms

The Ashcroft Memorandum establishes Department of Justice
charging and sentencing policy in federal criminal cases. In most
cases, it requires federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most
serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the
facts of the case ...." The memorandum provides for a few enumerated exceptions, which require express authorization by an Assistant
Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, or another designated supervisor.l19
To support the policy set forth in the memorandum, the Attorney
General invoked the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which he described as "a watershed event in the pursuit of fairness and consistency
116
117

In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 486-87 (D.N.M. 1992).
See, e.g.,
See MANUAL, supra note 39, § 9-27.150 (explaining that the provisions in the United

States Attorney's Manual are "not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to
create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party to litigation with the United States"). But see United States v. Schnepper, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1170,
1187 (D. Haw. 2004) ("Being sentenced pursuant to an invalid system . . . presents an
'actual, concrete invasion of a legally protected interest.'" (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))). Schnepper might suggest that, were a defendant able
to prove somehow that the lack of prosecutorial discretion curtailed his right to an actor
bound to seek justice, he might be able to obtain standing to challenge the Ashcroft Memorandum. See id. Judge Easterbrook, however, has stated that "Criminals have neither a
moral nor a constitutional claim to equal or entirely proportional treatment. Constitutional law is not a device allowing judges to set the 'just price' of crime, to prescribe the
ratio of retailers' to manufacturers' sentences." United States v, Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312,
1326 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
118
See, e.g., Gerald L. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.

Rrv. 63, 70-71 (1980) (proffering ais "approach [to] the problems of professional ethics
from a perspective that recognizes the importance of practical judgment and moral
sentiment").
119
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2; see also United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining
decisions are particularly ill-suited for broad judicial oversight."); United States v. Simpson,
927 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The doctrine of separation of powers requiresjudicial respect for the independence of the prosecutor.").
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in the federal criminal justice system"'' 20 that was intended to promote
transparency and honesty in sentencing, guide judicial sentencing discretion, and encourage judges to impose "appropriately different punishments for offenses of differing severity." 12 1 He also suggested that
the PROTECT Act1 22 reaffirmed Congressional "commitment to the
principles of consistency and effective deterrence ... embodied in the
123
Sentencing Guidelines."
Section 401 (1) (1) of the PROTECT Act instructs the Attorney
General to issue a report stating the policies and procedures adopted
by the Department of Justice pursuant to the PROTECT Act, including information regarding every downward departure a judge has
granted. 124 Response to the reporting requirement has been critical: 125 former U.S. Attorney John S. Martin cited the new requirements as a key reason for his decision to retire from his thirteen-year
120

Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1.
Id.
122
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) [hereinafter PROTECT Act] (to be
codified in scattered sections of Titles 18, 28, and 42 of the U.S. Code).
12l Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1. Congress passed the PROTECT Act on
April 30, 2003 "[t]o prevent child abduction and the sexual exploitation of children, and
for other purposes." Title IV of the PROTECT Act, known as the Feeney Amendment,
addresses sentencing reform and advocates implementing sentencing guidelines relating
to child abduction and sex offenses. See PROTECT Act § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (2003)
(to be codified in scattered sections of Title 18 and 28 of the U.S. Code)).
This Note only briefly addresses the reporting requirement. The Feeney Amendment
requires the Attorney General to submit a report to the House and Senate Committees on
theJudiciary every time a sentencing judge downwardly departs. The report must include
information about the facts of the case, the name of the judge, the reasons given for departure, and whether the court gave the prosecutor notice that it was planning to depart from
the Guidelines. The report also requires information about the position taken by the prosecution and defense regarding the departure, whether the United States intends to file a
motion for reconsideration, and whether the government plans to appeal. See PROTECT
Act § 401(l) (2), 117 Stat. 650, 674-75 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(l) (2) (West
Supp. 2004)).
The Feeney Amendment imposes no duty to report federal judges who upwardly depart when the prosecutor does not request an upward departure. In one circuit, twentythree out of twenty-five downward departures were overturned, while forty-four out of
forty-six upward departures were affirmed. See United States v. Yirkovsky, 338 F.3d 936,
943-45 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney J., dissenting) ("It is difficult for me to reconcile this
contrast, and I am deeply concerned with the trend and the message it sends to district
courts-that more severe sentences are far more likely to withstand appellate review.").
Importantly, almost all of these cases were tried pre-Feeney Amendment. One can anticipate that the new reporting requirement may further chill the ability of district judges to
downwardly depart, and may also lead a prosecutor who might otherwise accede to a departure to fight it.
124
See PROTECT Act § 401(1) (2), 117 Stat. 650, 674-75 (2003).
125
See Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Sentencing Commission's
Response to the Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 98, 98 (2003) (describing thejudiciary's
response as "vibrant and persistent in its opposition" to the Feeney Amendment).
121
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stint as a federal district judge.126 Writing in The New York Times, he
explained that the Sentencing Guidelines impede judges in their efforts to formulate just sentences, and he "no longer want[ed] to be
part of our unjust criminal justice system." 127 Judge Martin was not
averse to appropriately tough sentences: he once sentenced a gang
leader to life-plus-forty-five without communication privileges, to be
served in solitary confinement. 2 1 Nor was he alone in his criticism:
two other federal judges recently lambasted the Sentencing Guidelines and Attorney General Ashcroft's new reporting requirement. 129
Senator Edward Kennedy warned that the reporting requirements will
establish a "blacklist" of federal judges who choose to make downward
departures, 3 0 and the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary
Committee, John Conyers, described the requirement as a "scary" effort to assemble an "enemies list" of lenient judges.""' Chief Justice
William Rehnquist feared that the reporting requirement would "seriously impair the ability of courts to impose just and reasonable
sentences.' u 32 Thus, while Ashcroft characterized his command that
all federal prosecutors "charge and pursue the most serious, readily
provable offense or offenses" 133 as an effort to fulfill the Justice Department's "legal obligation to enforce faithfully and honestly the
Sentencing Reform Act, the PROTECT Act, and the Sentencing
126 Zachary L. Berman, Judge Martin Leaves Bench Criticalof Sentencing Rules, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 15, 2003, at 1.
127 John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do TheirJobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31.
128 Berman, supra note 126, at 1.
129
See Mark Hamblett, Judge Takes Aim at Congress In Sentencing UN Shooter, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 22, 2003, at 1 ("Calling recent legislation in Congress aimed at reducing downward
departures by judges 'their latest attack on the third branch of government,' Judge Patterson gave a man who fired the shots in a political protest a lesser sentence than agreed to in
a plea agreement between the prosecution and the defense."); see also United States v.
Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006-07 (D. Minn. 2003) ("Congress and the Attorney General have instituted policies designed to intimidate and threaten judges into refusing to
depart downward, and those policies are working."); Richard B. Schmitt, Tough Sentencing
on Trial in Airline Security Breach, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at A24 (describing Kirsch).
130 Mark H. Allenbaugh, The PROTECT Act's Sentencing Provisions, and the Attorney General's ControversialMemo: An Assault Against the FederalCourts, FindLaw's Writ, Aug. 13, 2003
(citing concerns of numerous jurists, including Chief Justice William Rehnquist's warning
that targeting decisions made by individual judges "could amount to an unwarranted and
ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial
duties"), at http://writ.findlaw.com/allenbaugh/20030813.html (last visited Aug. 28,
2004).
131

Curt Anderson, Ashcroft to WatchJudges Whose Sentences Are Lenient, CHI. SUN-TIMES,

Aug. 8, 2003, at 29. For an example of what happened when one judge reported his decision to reduce a sentence, see United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR. A.
01-10469-WGY, CR. A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 'WL 1381101, at *49 n.388 (D. Mass. June 18,
2004) (describing Judge Young's experience with the House Judiciary Committee after he
reduced a defendant's sentence below the recommendation in the pre-sentence report).
132 See Anderson, supra note 131, at 29.
133 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2.
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Guidelines,"'13 4 judges and others expressed concern that rigid sentencing requirements were preventing just results in certain cases. 13 5
The constraints placed on judges' sentencing discretion make the
prosecutor's duty to seek justice even more important. The broad,
overlapping crimes defined by the United States Code, from which a
prosecutor must select her charges, permit the prosecutor to exercise
a great deal of power in applying the law of the statute to the facts of
the case. 136 She must be granted sufficient discretion to consider
precepts of justice when using this power.
Ashcroft provided only six exceptions to his requirement that
prosecutors charge the most serious, readily provable offense. 137 First,
if the applicable Guideline range used to impose the sentence would
not change, a prosecutor can choose not to charge or pursue a readily
provable offense.1 38 Second, allowance is made for "fast-track" programs relying on "charge bargaining. " 139 Third, if the evidence
14 0
changes after indictment-or for "some other justifiable reason"' the prosecutor may dismiss the charges, but only with the written approval of the U.S. Attorney, an Assistant Attorney General, or another
designated supervisor. 14 1 Fourth, the prosecutor may "in rare circumstances" offer a charge reduction in a plea agreement if the defendant
provides substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another
person. 42 Fifth, while federal prosecutors are often required to file
134

Id.

See supra notes 125-32.
in fact, one commentator argues that prosecutors should be required to charge the
most specific statute applicable to the defendant's act, to the exclusion of any more general statutes. See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization,90 U. VA. I.. REv. __
(forthcoming 2005). He further argues that a reinvigorated "rule of lenity" would permit
federal courts to monitor this new sentencing requirement. Id. While requiring prosecutors to charge under thc more specific statute will not always result in lesser penalties, it
will not expose defendants to greater scntences than they might already face and will often
either lead to a lesser sentence for the more-specific crime, or federal declination in favor
of state prosecution. See id. (citing the thirty-year maximum for "more specific" bank
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2000), versus the twenty-year maximum for "more general" wire,
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) or mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000)).
137
See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2-5.
135
136

138

Id. at 3.

139 Id.A fast-track program permits expedited disposition "whereby the Government
agrees to charge less than the most serious, readily provable offense[, but] only when
clearly warranted by local conditions within a district." Id.; see Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years
After the FederalSentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and
Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 Am. CraM. L. Rxv. 87, 96 n.41 (2003) ("Charge bargaining occurs when prosecutors agree to accept a plea of guilty to less serious charges than those for
which the defendant would have gone to trial."); see also infra Part III.D (assessing the
legitimacy of fast-track programs).
140
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12 at 3 (giving, as examples of "justifiable reasons," witness unavailability and the need to protect the identity of a witness scheduled to
testify against a more significant defendant).
141
142

See id.
See id.
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statutory enhancements 143 to increase penalties, a prosecutor can
forego the statutory enhancement in certain circumstances.1 44 If the
prosecutor offers a negotiated plea agreement after considering factors in § 9-27.420 of the Manual, she may decline to file the statutory
enhancement. 45 Additionally, a prosecutor may dismiss or forego
charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), but only under certain circumstances and with her supervisor's approval.' 46 Finally, in other
"exceptional circumstances" (and with written approval from the U.S.
Attorney, an Assistant Attorney General, or another designated supervisor) prosecutors may decline to pursue or may dismiss readily provable charges.' 47 The supervisor should give approval when, for
example, the office is "particularly over-burdened," when the trial
might be lengthy, or when trying the case "would significantly reduce
1 48
the total number of cases disposed of by the office."

143
Statutory enhancements, except those for prior convictions, may be unconstitutional after Blakely v. Washington. See 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); see also infta Part
III.E (evaluating the potential invalidation of statutory enhancements in light of Blakely).
Pre-Blakely, the government needed only to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant committed additional crimes-regardless of whether he was charged with
those crimes or whether the jury returned a not guilty verdict on those crimes-for the
court to consider that information at sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148, 156-57 (1997); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3, cmt. background (2003) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES ] ("Conduct that is not formally
charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination
of the applicable guideline sentencing range."). In determining that the proper standard
of proof for the cases was a preponderance of the evidence, the Watts court "acknowledge[d] a divergence of opinion among the Circuits as to whether, in extreme circumstances, relevant conduct that would dramatically increase the sentence must be based on
clear and convincing evidence," but did not address the issue. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 156.
144
See Ashcroft Memorandum, supranote 12, at 4. If authorized by an Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Attorney, or designated supervisory attorney, a prosecutor can forego
filing statutory enhancements in negotiated plea agreements. This is the only situation in
which such upward enhancements may be forgone.
145
See MANUAL, supra note 39, at § 9-27.420. Considerations intended to guide attorneys' decisions in entering into plea agreements include: the defendant's criminal history,
willingness to cooperate, remorse, and willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct,
the seriousness and nature of the crimes charged, the probable sentence if the defendant
is convicted, and the expense of trial and appeal. Id.
146
SeeAshcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4. The statute provides for a five-year
minimum sentence if a defendant possesses a firearm during a crime of violence or drug
possession. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2004). Regardless, the Ashcroft Memorandum requires prosecutors to pursue the "first readily provable violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),"
and, if there are three or more readily provable violations, the first two such charges in "all
but exceptional cases." Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 4-5; see generally Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer Ever Get To Trial,
Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al ("The percentage of federal criminal prosecutions resolved by trials also declined, to less than 5 percent last year from 15 percent in
1962. The number of prosecutions more than doubled in the last four decades, but the
number of criminal trials fell, to 3,574 last year from 5,097 in 1962.").
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Plea agreements are similarly constrained. 149 All plea agreements
must be in writing to "facilitate efforts by the Department of Justice
and the Sentencing Commission to monitor compliance by federal
prosecutors with Department policies and the Sentencing Guide150
In a
lines," and to avoid misunderstandings between the parties.
Proand
Policies
"Department
regarding
July 28, 2003 memorandum
Sentencing
and
Recommendations
cedures Concerning Sentencing
Appeals," which required "honesty in sentencing" regarding both the
facts and the law, Ashcroft stated,
Any sentencing recommendation made by the United States in a
particular case must honestly reflect the totality and seriousness of
the defendant's conduct and must be fully consistent with the
Guidelines and applicable statutes and with the1 5 readily provable
facts about the defendant's history and conduct. '
Here, Ashcroft clarified that "this Memorandum by its terms
152
supercedes prior Department guidance" regarding plea bargains.
The Manual requires prosecutors to inform the court if a plea agreement includes a "charge bargain," 153 and charge bargaining is only
permitted "to the extent consistent with the principles set forth" in
the six enumerated exceptions to the Memorandum's requirement
154
that prosecutors charge and pursue all readily provable offenses.
When engaging in sentence bargaining, a prosecutor may agree to a
"plea agreement for a sentence that is within the specified guideline
range,' 1 55 or to endorse a downward adjustment if she genuinely believes that the defendant has accepted responsibility.1-5 6 "Fact bargain149
Currently, less than five percent of federal criminal prosecutions are resolved by a
trial. See Liptak, supra note 148, at Al (citing an ABA study that found that the number of
federal prosecutions doubled from 1962 to 2002, and the number of criminal trials fell
from over 5,000 to 3,574). Another criticism of the Ashcroft Memorandum is that defendants will find plea bargains less attractive due to the prosecutor's reduced ability to offer
shorter sentences. Some are concerned about the flood of litigation that would result if
Gary Craig, Ashcroft PleaDeal Curb May Clog
defendants insisted on going to trial. See, e.g.,
Courts, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester, N.Y.), Sept. 29, 2003, at B4 (citing a commentator
who suggested that defendants faced with the same sentence regardless of whether they
plead or went to trial will "roll the dice and go to trial"). Another, more troubling possibility, is that "'[i]f the only way you can get some sort of break is to cooperate and provide
information, you are likely to provide the information' . . . 'and the truth will be
stretched."' Shelley Murphy, Directives Against Federal Plea Bargains Spur Debate, BoSToN
GLOBE, Sept. 25, 2003, at B8 (quoting Boston defense attorney Michael Liston).
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5.
150
Id. at 5.
151
152 Id. This suggests that the Ashcroft Memorandum abrogates the requirements in
the Manual. See supra Part I.B.1.
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5. (citing MANUAL, supra note 39, §§ 9153
27.300(B), 9-27.400(B)).
154 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5.
155
Id. at 6.
156 Id. (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 143, § 3EL.). An adjustment is not
the same thing as a departure. Simplistically, adjustments are covered in chapter three of
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ing"' 57 is forbidden. 5 8 Similarly, the prosecutor cannot agree to any
plea agreement that presents the sentencing court with "less than a
full understanding of all readily provable facts relevant to
159
sentencing."'
Once again invoking the PROTECT Act, Ashcroft pointed out
that the Act calls for a reduction of the existing grounds for downward
departures' 60 and instructed that federal prosecutors must not request or merely stand silent when a defendant requests a downward
departure. 16' Again, however, a prosecutor may accede to or request
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual and are a part of the offense level. The offense
level and the defendant's criminal history then compute the sentence, from which ajudge
may depart on grounds listed in chapter five of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual.
For an excellent explanation of how the Sentencing Guidelines work, see Frank 0. Bowman Il, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on "SubstantialAssistance"
hPbllows a Decade of ProsecutorialIndiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REv. 7, 10-12 (1999).
157
See Weinstein, supranote 139, at 96 n.41 (describing charge bargaining as being "at
the heart of the plea bargaining process," and fact bargaining as being "more peculiar to
the Guidelines and involv[ing] an agreement between the prosecution and defense that
the defendant will be sentenced on the basis of agreed-upon facts which will, if accepted by
the court, place the defendant in a lower sentencing range than he would likely have faced
after trial").
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5; see also SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
158
note 143, § 6B1.4 (requiring accurate stipulations of facts in plea bargains).
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 5. This provision appears to require all
159
prosecutors in the sentencing phase to submit evidence suppressed as illegal in the trial-inchief if that evidence would affect the final sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 956
F.2d 1256, 1263 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a districtjudge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence
at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment."). Prior to the Ashcroft Memorandum and the PROTECT Act, one commentator
pointed to prosecutors', defense attorneys', and judges' likely "resistance" to permitting
illegal evidence from intruding upon the sentencing proceedings, resulting in "needless,
unwarranted, hidden disparity contrary to the [Sentencing Reform Amendment]." Daniel
J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1740 (1992). For a discussion of the constitutional implications of using uncharged conduct-regardless of whether evidence supporting that conduct was suppressed because it violated the defendant's constitutional rights or because
the prosecutor simply chose to exclude it-see Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines
Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 161, 208-13 (1991). Note, however,
that courts have long been permitted to consider uncharged conduct for sentencing purposes. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) ("The due-process clause should
not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold
of trial procedure."). Blakely v. Washington and its progeny may, however, require ajury to
find any facts that compel a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence. See 542 U.S. __,
124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004).
SeePROTECT Act § 401(m), 117 Star. 650, 675 (2003) (requiring the U.S. Sentenc160
ing Commission to "promulgate . . . appropriate amendments to the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary to ensure that the incidence of downward
departures are substantially reduced"); cf. United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318,
1323 (D. Utah 2003) (examining legislative history to conclude that the "Feeney Amendment makes no change" to a judge's ability to downwardly or upwardly depart in all but
select cases).
161
See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6.
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a downward departure, if authorized by the appropriate supervisory
authority, when the defendant offers substantial assistance' 62 to the
government's case or fortuitously offended in ajurisdiction with a fasttrack program for his crime. 163
Other downward departures should be a "'rare occurenc[e],"'
and "[p]rosecutors must affirmatively oppose downward departures
that are not supported by the facts and the law, and must not agree to
'stand silent' with respect to such departures."' 64 By its terms, the
Memorandum permits prosecutors to independently review the "facts
and the law." Nevertheless, the tenor of the Memorandum and the
otherwise carefully-and narrowly-enunciated "discretion" provided
to prosecutors suggests that "facts and law" supporting departures are
likely intended to be those principles enumerated earlier in the
Memorandum.
Ashcroft concluded the Memorandum by explaining that the Department of Justice must "ensure that all federal criminal cases are
prosecuted according to the same standards. Fundamental fairness
requires that all defendants prosecuted in the federal criminal justice
system be subject to the same standards and treated in a consistent
65
manner."1
B.

Distinguishing the Thornburgh Memorandum

The Ashcroft Memorandum implies that it is a return to
prosecutorial discretion' 66 as defined by Attorney General Thornburgh in 1989 (Thornburgh Memorandum)1 67 after the Supreme
162

Id.

163

Id.

164

Id. at 7 (first alteration in original) (quoting SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note

143, ch. 1, pt. A, (4)(b)).
165
Id. at 7.
166 See id. at 1.

167 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70. Janet Reno departed from the Thornburgh Memorandum, suggesting that prosecutors may consider "such factors as [whether]
the sentencing guideline range . . . is proportional to the seriousness of the defendant's
conduct...." See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Holders of U.S.
Attorneys' Manual, Tide 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT. R. 352 (1994). But see
Robinson, supra note 18, at 887-89 (criticizing Janet Reno's decision to change Thornburgh's standards, and reporting communication between Senator Hatch and Attorney
General Reno in which she "clarified" that "individual prosecutors are not free to follow
their own lights or to ignore legislative directives[,]" rather
it remains the directive of the Department of Justice that prosecutors
charge the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the
defendant's conduct, that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction; that
prosecutors adhere to the Sentencing Guidelines; and that charging and
plea agreements be made at an appropriate level of responsibility with appropriate documentation.
). Frank Bowman noted that this response suggested that Reno reverted to the Thornburgh policy. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other
Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 727-28,
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Court upheld the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act. 1' 8
While the two memoranda are similar, 169 several distinctions should
be recognized.
First, the Thornburgh Memorandum states that federal prosecutors "should initially charge the most serious, readily provable offense
or offenses consistent with the defendant's conduct."'170 The Ashcroft
Memorandum requires prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the
facts of the case."' 7 1 The distinction between the "facts of the case" and
the "defendant's conduct" is significant. In requiring prosecutors to
consider the "defendant's conduct," the Thornburgh Memorandum
suggested a more individualized assessment, keyed to the defendant's
culpability.' 72 Directing prosecutors to weigh the "facts of the case,"
however, implies a less particularized assessment based more on the
provability of the elements of a crime rather than the culpability of
the criminal actor. Also, the Thornburgh Memorandum requires a
prosecutor to initially charge the most serious offense, suggesting that
the prosecutor may revisit that initial determination. 173 In contrast,
the Ashcroft Memorandum requires a prosecutor to charge and pursue
the more serious offense, suggesting that she cannot revisit her initial
decision if she uncovers mitigating circumstances that indicate a lesser
174
charge would be more appropriate.
Both memoranda permit sentence bargaining since a prosecutor
may agree to recommend a sentence at the lower end of the Guidelines. t 7 5 Thornburgh, however, permitted prosecutors to "seek to den.171 (citingJames K. Bredar &Jeffrey E. Risberg, The Reno Retreat: New Department ofJustice
"Bluesheet"DOA, 6 FED. SENT. REP. 313 (1994)). Rather than addressing whether the Reno
policy "stuck" and provided more prosecutorial discretion, this Note examines the current
policy embodied in the Ashcroft Memorandum-as compared to the Thornburgh Memorandum-and that policy's interaction with the conception of a prosecutor's charge to
"seek justice."
168
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
169
Compare the remarks of Professor Stephen Saltiburg, one of Thornburgh's deputy

assistant attorneys general, who stated that "'[t]he resemblance to the Thornburgh memo
is uncanny,'" with those of former Connecticut U.S. Attorney under Thornburgh Stanley
Twardy, who contended that "[t]his is the latest in Ashcroft's efforts to centralize power in
Washington.... It gives prosecutors in the field less discretion." Hechler, supra note 15, at
25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170
Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22 (emphasis added).
171
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added).
172 See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22.
173
Id. (emphasis added).
174
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added).
175
Compare Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6 ("[W]hen the Sentencing
Guidelines range is 18-24 months, a prosecutor may agree to recommend a sentence of 18
or 20 months rather than argue for a sentence at the top of the range."), with Thornburgh
Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422 (stating that "prosecutors may bargain for a sentence
that is within the specified guideline range" and giving the "18-24 months example").
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part from the guidelines," as long as the plea "honestly reflect[ed] the
totality and seriousness of the defendant's conduct ....,176 Furthermore, a prosecutor could use any of the enumerated departures to
depart without a supervisor's approval and was only required to consult with supervisors if she wished to depart on grounds not specifi177
cally listed.
Discretion to request or accede to downward departures is much
more constrained by the Ashcroft Memorandum. Citing the PROTECT Act, the Ashcroft Memorandum outlines enumerated circumstances in which the prosecutor may depart-all of which demand
explicit permission from an Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Attorney,
or designated supervisory attorney. 178 Prosecutors may depart if a defendant has provided "substantia' assistance, 1 79 or if their office has a
"fast-track" program for the offense.' 80 In "rare occurrences" prosecutors may acquiesce in other downward departures, 181 but they must
"affirmatively oppose downward departures that are not supported by
the facts and the law, and cannot agree to 'stand silent' with respect to
such departures."18 2 Under the Ashcroft Memorandum, when prosecutors support a departure, they should identify the grounds to create
a record for judicial review.'1 3 Similarly, the Thornburgh Memorandum expected prosecutors to "reveal to the court the departure" and
Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-23.
See id. at 422 (addressing the subject of "Departures Generally").
178
See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6-7 ("Congress has made clear its view
that there have been too many downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines, and
it has instructed the Commission to take measures 'to ensure that the incidence of downward departure [is] substantially reduced.'" (alteration in original) (citing PROTECT Act
§ 401 (m)(2) (A), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003))). The PROTECT Act also explains Congress's
intent "to ensure that Department of Justice attorneys oppose sentencing adjustments, including downward departures, that are not supported by the facts and the law," and requires that a report regarding a judge's decision to downwardly depart include "the
position of the parties with respect to the downward departure." This suggests that Congress anticipated that downward departures might be filed or supported by federal prosecutors. See PROTECT Act §§ 401 (0(1) (A), 401(o (2) (B) (v), 117 Stat. 650, 674-75 (2003).
179
See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6. Similarly, the Thornburgh Memorandum describes this as "the most important departure," and suggests that "prosecutors
who bargain in good faith and who state reasons for recommending a departure should
find that judges are receptive to their recommendations." Thornburgh Memorandum,
supra note 70, at 421-23.
180 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6-7.
181
See id. at 7 (citing SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 143, ch. 1, pt. A (4)(b)).
The Sentencing Commission granted the courts "legal freedom to depart from the guidelines," both in instances recognized by the guidelines regarding departures and on
grounds not recognized by the departure guidelines. The Commission suggests that courts
"will not [depart] very often," however, as the Sentencing Guidelines are intended to account for most factors relevant to sentencing practices. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 143, ch. 1, pt. A (4) (b)).
182
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
183
See id.
176

177
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to "afford an opportunity for the court to reject it."' a8 4 The Thorn-

burgh Memorandum, therefore, appeared to address primarily the
trial court's ability to determine the appropriateness of the departure
rather than an appellate court's ability to review the trial court's
18 5
acquiescence.
Both memoranda decry fact bargaining.18 6 The Thornburgh
Memorandum did suggest, however, that providing the court with the
"true nature of the defendant's involvement in a case will not always
lead to a higher sentence."' 8 7 It also allowed the prosecutor to agree
with a defendant that self-incriminating information he provided
when cooperating would not be used against him in determining the
applicable guideline range.' 88
The Thornburgh Memorandum did not address the Department
ofJustice's position on the negotiability of statutory enhancements or
the exercise of discretion regarding their implementation. The Ashcroft Memorandum, however, provides that statutory enhancements
are "strongly encouraged."18 9 A prosecutor may only forgo enhancements through a negotiated plea agreement that is subject to several
restrictions. 190
Finally, the Thornburgh Memorandum concluded that federal
prosecutors had the "tools necessary" to arrive at "appropriate dispositions in the process" so that their honest application of the Guidelines
would make sentences "fair, honest, and apprriate."' 9 1 The Ashcroft
Memorandum, however, describes the Thornburgh Memorandum as
intended to "ensure that [federal prosecutors'] practices were consisSee Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22.
District of Massachusetts ChiefJudge William Young has described how prosecutors
could comply with the letter of the Sentencing Guidelines by simply dismissing charges if
the judge would not accede to a plea bargain. See United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 0210054-WGY, CR. A. 01-10469-WGY, CR.A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101, at *32 n.282
(D. Mass. June 18, 2004).
186 See supra note 157-58 and accompanying text.
187 Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422-23.
188 See id. (requiring also that the agreement be included in the defendant's case file
with a note that § 5K.1.B1.8 was invoked in determining the sentence, and that the incriminating information be disclosed to the court or probation officer). Elsewhere, Thornburgh gave concrete examples of how a prosecutor can bargain within the Guidelines,
"recommending a sentence at the low end of a guideline range" and "a two level downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility" to yield substantially shorter sentences. Id.
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4. Statutory enhancements where judges
189
engage in fact-finding to increase a maximum sentence are likely unconstitutional under
124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004); supra note 143;
Blakely. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. -,
infra Part III.E.
190 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4 (suggesting that an important purpose in foregoing filing statutory enhancements is to induce a defendant to plead guilty, as
filing enhancements might cause the statutory sentence to exceed the Guideline range,
"ensuring that the defendant will not receive any credit for acceptance of responsibility
and will have no incentive to plead guilty").
191 See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422-23 (emphasis added).
184
185
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tent with the principles of equity, fairness, and uniformity,"' 92 and purports to adopt these principles as its own. With such disparate
language, any claim that the Ashcroft Memorandum is merely a return to the principles of the Thornburgh Memorandum is indefensible. The Ashcroft Memorandum represents a substantial movement
away from case-by-case determination of a defendant's culpability and
hinders prosecutors' ability to seek justice in every situation.
III
PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS AND THE ASHCROFT MEMORANDUM

In holding to ethical standards,an attorney for the Government cannot be a
193
mere minion of the Government.

The Ashcroft Memorandum suggests that the role of the prosecutor is not unlike the unbridled advocacy often encouraged in defense
attorneys, and risks turning prosecutors into little more than the government's "hired guns."1 9 4 The Supreme Court, however, clearly rejected this conception of the prosecutorial role in Berger v. United
States.' 9 5 Furthermore, transforming federal prosecutors' responsibilities into near-ministerial adherence to a memorandum that demands
uniformity at the expense of individualized justice will undermine the
individual offices' reputations for probity, integrity, and judgment, 96
as well as hinder a prosecutor's ability to comply with ethical norms
requiring her to pursue justice. The Ashcroft Memorandum may thus
represent an unfortunate new era in federal prosecution. It is not
merely an epoch in which charging and plea bargaining have been
massaged into compliance with a universal set of norms, but one in
which prosecutors' duties as ministers ofjustice recede and they don a
mantle of blind advocacy.

192

Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at I (emphasis added).

193

See In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 488 (D.N.M. 1992).
See, e.g., MONROE H. FaEDMAN,
LAWYERs' ETHICS IN AN ADvERsARY SYSTEM 9-26

194

(1975).
195 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that "while [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one"); see also Simon, supra note 3, at 1090 (recognizing the distinction between the role of the judge and prosecutor and that of other attorneys, and arguing
that all "lawyer[s] should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of
the particular case, seem most likely to promote justice").
196 According to a former Assistant U.S. Attorney, the Southern District took its "duty
to do justice" seriously and jealously guarded its "reputation for probity, for integrity,
[and] for judgment." Surely it is not the only U.S. Attorney's office to do so. Bruce AGreen, Why Should Prosecutors "SeekJustice"?, 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 607-08 (1999).
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One unintended consequence of the Ashcroft Memorandum may
be prosecutorial rebellion. 9 7 Some reports about federal prosecutors' reactions to the memorandum suggest that prosecutors may be
refusing to obey its directives.1 98 One anonymous federal prosecutor
commented that "where there is tension between what my local district judge wants and what General Ashcroft wants, the local judge
wins every time." 199 Forcing prosecutors to choose between charging
a defendant beyond his culpability or not bringing charges at all could
result in unanticipated declinations that would be difficult to monitor.2 0 0 Prosecutors and defense attorneys may also "collude" with
judges to avoid the unduly harsh sentences that may follow from abid20 1
It
ing by the Feeney Amendment and the Ashcroft Memorandum.
thus appears that goals of uniformity can be undercut by promulgating overly prescriptive and punitive rules.
It should be no consolation, however, that prosecutors may be
able to "squeeze fairness" into the Ashcroft Memorandum. 20 2 Any
197
One commentator suggested that "the tough-sounding policies [of the Ashcroft
Memorandum] include exceptions that any wise prosecutor (and there are many wise prosecutors) could drive a truck through." Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction:Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1257 (2004).
198
See, e.g., NancyJ. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 316,
320-21 (2004); Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the FederalSentencing Guidelines:Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciamy, 109th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Blakely Senate
Hearings] (statement of Frank Bowman, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 260&wit_id=647 (last visited Aug. 29, 2004). In July 2004, the author spoke with a Federal Public Defender who
reported that, not long after the Ashcroft Memorandum was distributed, a representative
from the local United States Attorney's Office assured the federal public defenders that the
office would make no policy changes.
Blakely itself may represent judicial rebellion against "unjust" sentencing requirements. Frank Bowman suggests that the Supreme Court's decision to invalidate Washington state's sentencing guidelines in Blakely, thus calling into question the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, stemmed from the "boiling frustration of the federal judiciary over
the state of the federal sentencing system." See Memorandum from Frank Bowman to the
U.S. Sentencing Commission 1-2 (June 27, 2004), available at http://sentencing.typepad.
com /sentencinglaw-and -policy/ files/ frank_ bowman_ original_ memo- to_ ussc_ on
blakely.doc (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
199 King & Klein, supra note 198, at 320.
200
Thanks to Professor Stephen F. Smith for this point.
201
Blakely Senate Hearings, supra note 198 (statement of Frank Bowman, Professor of
Law, Indiana University School of Law).
202
Zachary Carter, former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, believes
that federal prosecutors can still "squeeze fairness into these policies," as the Ashcroft
Memorandum "makes an attempt to constrict discretion, but it doesn't do so absolutely."
Hechler, supra note 15, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). Professor Daniel Freed,
editor of the Federal Sentencing Reporter, suggested that the federal courts could still hand
down sentences tailored to the individual defendant and crime because Congress never
articulated the purpose of sentencing. See Freed, supranote 159, at 1709. Freed includes
among the "sentencers" judges, probation officers, defense attorneys, and prosecutors. Id.
at 1719-27. One might expand Freed's premise-that Congressional "punting" frees
judges to craft more individualized sentences-to permit prosecutors to continue to exercise discretion. See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at I ("[Flederal prosecutors
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document guiding prosecutors in their execution of the federal criminal laws should not require a stilted reading or outright disobedience
2 3
to permit them to fulfill their ethical and legal duty to seek justice.
Furthermore, the Memorandum's tight rein on prosecutorial discretion may imply that the Attorney General feels that prosecutors cannot be trusted to "make the calls" on their cases. 20 4 To John S.
Martin-the former U.S. Attorney and Southern District Judge-this
"harsh tone" was more troubling than any potential change in
20 5
protocol.
The prescriptive-almost punitive-language of the Ashcroft
Memorandum stands in stark contrast to Ashcroft's earlier edict requiring prosecutors to "promptly advise the Criminal Division of all
cases in which Second Amendment issues are raised." 20 6 In that memorandum, by way of comparison, Ashcroft invoked the rousing language of Berger v. United States,20 7 stating that "U] ustice is best
achieved, not by making any available argument that might win a case,
but by vigorously enforcing federal law in a manner that heeds the
commands of the Constitution."

20 8

The Memorandum might also lead to undeserved "leniency" for
more culpable offenders. By over aggregating, 20 9 the Ashcroft Memorandum does not only over-punish the less culpable; treating offend[must] adhere to the principles and objectives of the Sentencing Reform Act, the PROTECT Act, and the Sentencing Guidelines ....").

2034 This duty is enhanced by the Sentencing Guidelines and the reporting requirement in the PROTECT Act. As a Federal Public Defender stated prior to the Ashcroft
Memorandum, "If we severely limit a judge's discretion, aren't we handing justice over to
the prosecutor?" Richard Willing, Judges Co Soft on Sentences More Often: Growing Number
DepartfiomFederal Guidelines, U.S.A. TODAY, Aug. 28, 2003, at IA (internal quotation marks
omitted).
204 As a federal prosecutor commented, "You have to count on reasonable prosecutors
to make a reasonable assessment of what a case is worth and give them discretion" to make
decisions about cases. Murphy, supra note 149, at B8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
More acerbically, a Boston criminal defense lawyer suggested that Attorney General Ashcroft "might as well enter his appearance and try everyone himself because he certainly
doesn't trust his prosecutors and judges." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
205 See Hechler, supra note 15, at 25.
206 See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to All United States Attorneys (Nov. 9, 2001) (noting that Ashcroft was "pleased that [the Fifth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Emerson] upholds the constitutionality of 18 U.S[.]C. 922(g)(8) .. .and
specifically affirmed that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals, including those not then actually a member of any militia ... to privately possess and bear their
own firearms" (internal quotation marks omitted)), available at http://www.usdoj-gov/ag/
readingroom/emerson.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
207
See id,(stating that "the mission of the Department 'in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done'" (quoting Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
208

See id.

200 Aggregation is "the treatment of many cases all at once." Alschuler, supra note 18,
at 904.
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ers of differing culpability alike 2 10 means that the more culpable are
under-punished relative to others convicted of the same crime. 21 1 For
instance, a longshoreman-a "good, honest worker" with a clean record-who accepted five dollars to drive his friend to a hamburger
stand so the friend could make a drug transaction was sentenced to
ten years in prison, the statutory maximum. 2 12 Someone who had actually purchased the drugs and resold them would have been exposed
to about the same sentence. If the criminal justice system intends to
link the punishment and the crime in some rational way, punishing
the less culpable as harshly as the more culpable fails to satisfy that
objective.231 To the extent that punishment schemes are intended to
reflect the loss suffered by an individual victim or society at large, punishing a less culpable offender as much as a more culpable offender
may send a message to the victims of the latter that the system does
not appreciate their greater loss. Therefore, even if the Justice Department has the "prerogative" 214 to strip discretion from prosecutors,
the ethical dilemma those prosecutors face is still present. Prosecutors cannot evade their ethical duties by submitting a copy of their
boss's memorandum.
As Senator Leahy commented at the Blakely hearings, "[J]ustice is not just about
210
treating like cases alike; it is also about treating different cases differently." Blakely Senate
Hearings, supra note 198 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
211
As H.L.A. Hart observed, "Principles ofjustice or fairness between different offenders require morally distinguishable offences to be treated differently and morally similar
offences to be treated alike." H.L.A. HART, LAw, LiBERrY, AND MORALTY 36-37 (1963).
212
See New Drug Law Leaves No Room for Mercy, Cm. TRiB, Oct. 5, 1989, at 28C. District
Judge William Schwarzer, who sobbed openly during the sentencing, stated, "We are required to follow the rule of law ... but in this case the law does anything but serve justice.... It may profit us very little to win the war on drugs if in the process we lose our
soul." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Schwarzer later called the sentence he imposed "a grave miscarriage of justice," required by a statute that turns judges
into "computers automatically imposing sentences without regard to what is just and right."
See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ira Eisenberg, An Alligatorfor the New AG, PLAIN
DEALER (CLEV.), April 3, 1993, at 7B. Judge Schwarzer, "a Republican known for his tough
decisions and dour demeanor," quit the bench not long after he handed down the longshoreman's sentence and campaigned for the repeal of mandatory minimum sentencing
laws as the head of the Federal Judicial Center in Washington, D.C. See id.
213 This Note recognizes that upward departures are available for particularly egregious conduct, and that the longshoreman would likely warrant a role reduction adjustment under § 3B1.2, which could result in a different sentence than that for his more
culpable friend. See SENrENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 143, § 3B1.2. Requiring prosecutors to fight every downward departure, however, suggests that the system will not recognize that some conduct is simply less damnable than that in the "heartland." The
"heartland" is the "set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider
whether departure is warranted." Id. § 1AI. app. 4(b).
214
Federal DistrictJudge David Larimer characterized the removal ofjudge and prosecutor discretion and concomitant centralization of decision-making as "unfortunate," but
"also the attorney general's prerogative." See Craig, supra note 149, at B4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The remainder of this Part has several objectives. First, it examines two specific instances in which the Ashcroft Memorandum
removes from prosecutors the discretion necessary to fulfill their ethical duty to seek justice. Next, this Part addresses the often-invoked
uniformity rationale for constraining discretion and suggests that the
exception for "fast-track" programs undercuts that rationale. Finally,
this Part briefly considers the potential impact of the Supreme Court's
21 5
recent opinion in Blakely v. Washington.
A.

Charging and Pursuing the Most Serious, Readily Provable
Offense

The Ashcroft Memorandum requires prosecutors to "charge and
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are
supported by the facts of the case." 216 This requirement is inconsistent with a prosecutor's traditional obligation to "recognize when the
circumstances of a person's situation are such that the prosecution
would do more harm than good," 2 1 7 and the nuanced discretion contemplated by the ethical codes and rules governing their behavior.
The Manual (which the Ashcroft Memorandum may have superseded) purports that its guidelines are just that: guidelines, "not
[rules] intended to produce rigid uniformity among Federal prosecutors in all areas of the country at the expense of the fair administration of justice."2 18 Such emphasis on the "fair administration of
justice" suggests that the Department of Justice-at least at one
time-afforded prosecutors some deference and permitted them to
consider mitigating and aggravating factors regarding the defendant's
2 19
culpability when charging him.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function likewise emphasize the prosecutor's duty to "seek justice, not merely to convict." 220 She should consider whether the
authorized punishment is proportional to the harm caused by the offender. 22 1 Furthermore, the Standards state that a prosecutor "is not
222
if
obliged to present all charges which the evidence might support"
223
the charges do not "fairly reflect the gravity of the offense."
215
216
217
218
219

Blakely v.Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2558 (2004).
See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 2.
See SUBIN ET AL., supra note 22, § 5.3(a) (internal quotation marks omitted).
MANUAL, supra note 39, § 9-27.140 cmt.
See, e.g., id. § 9-27.230 (suggesting prosecutors consider, inter alia, "[t]he probable

sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted," as well as his criminal history
and culpability).
220 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-1.2(c).
221
See id. § 3-3.9(b) (iii).

222
223

Id. § 3-3.9(b).
Id. § 3-3.9(0.
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In addition, Ethical Considerations in the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility counsel prosecutors to "use restraint in the
discretionary exercise of government powers [by refraining] from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. '22 4 The
Model Code also discourages the continuation of unfair litigation,
225
even if an individual prosecutor lacks discretionary powers.
Thus, none of the ethical guidelines require prosecutors to
charge and pursue the most serious offenses, and all counsel the prosecutor to consider the defendant's culpability before charging him
with a crime. The Thornburgh Memorandum also recognized that
while a prosecutor "should initially charge the most serious, readily
provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant's conduct,"2 2 6 further investigation of a case might reveal that pursuing the
most serious offense would be inappropriate.
The Ashcroft Memorandum, on the other hand, presents an entirely different picture of the prosecutorial role. It severely limits a
prosecutor's ability to revisit an initial charge after discovering that
the defendant's actual culpability may ethically require a lesser
charge-even if the "facts" may support the initial charge. In addition, the Ashcroft Memorandum "strongly encourage [s]" prosecutors
to file statutory enhancements. 227 It only permits prosecutors to
forego filing enhancements in negotiated plea agreements where the
defendant would otherwise have no incentive to plead guilty, suggesting that any "leniency" is merely sentencing gamesmanship. 228
The Ashcroft Memorandum thus prevents prosecutors from making
the individualized choices that every ethical guideline appears to
require.
B.

Required Opposition to Downward Departures

Curtailing a prosecutor's ability to request or accede to downward departures is arguably the Ashcroft Memorandum's most troubling requirement. 229 Compelling a prosecutor to ignore mitigating
supra note 94, EC 7-13, 7-14.
Id. at EC 7-14.
226
Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 421-22 (emphasis added).
227
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 4.
228
.See id.
229 See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6. Citing congressional displeasure
with downward departures tojustify preventing judges and inferior executive officers from
exercising their statutory discretion is troubling. In ChiefJustice William Rehnquist's 2003
annual statement, he sharply criticized the PROTECT Act reporting requirements for
judges who downwardly depart and stated that "'by constitutional design,' judges [have]
'an institutional commitment to the independent administration ofjustice and are able to
see the consequences or judicial reform proposals that legislative sponsors may not be in a
position to see.'" Linda Greenhouse, ChiefJusticeAttacks a Law as Infringing on Judges, N.Y.
TImEsJan. 1, 2004, at A14 (quoting the ChiefJustice). While Rehnquist targeted the con224

225

MODEL CODE,

2004]

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

circumstances and charge the most serious offense presents a different dilemma than requiring her to ignore those factors when ajudge
is deciding upon a sentence. One former federal prosecutor suggested thatjudicial discretion to give a lenient sentence may be appropriate, stating that "'[p]rosecutors know that particularly in drug
cases, the guidelines can't do perfect justice."2 30 Now that the ability
of judges to downwardly depart has been curtailed by the Feeney
Amendment, the prosecutor's role at sentencing may have changed.
Ethical guidelines counsel prosecutors to consider whether the
punishment fairly reflects the crime. The Manual directs prosecutors
to oppose unwarrantedsentencing departures2 3 1 and to make sentence
recommendations when required by the terms of a plea agreement, or
in "unusual cases" when the prosecutor is concerned about the fairness of a sentence. These recommendations may provide the needed
support for any suggestion that the judge increase or decrease a sentence. 23 2 Similarly, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice suggest
that prosecutors consider the potential punishment when charging
2
the defendant.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the PROTECT Act might
therefore require a prosecutor to play as active a role at the sentencing stage as she historically played at the charging stage.2 34 A prosecutor in a scheme that permits the judge great discretion in sentencing
could assume that her only 'job" was to present the facts, allow the
jury to convict, and simply leave the judge to sentence 'justly." Under
the Sentencing Guidelines and PROTECT Act, however, judges'
hands are more tightly bound with regard to sentencing. For instance, a government motion is necessary for a court to downwardly
gressional supervision of judges via the PROTECT Act's reporting requirements, prosecutors, too, have "an institutional commitment to the independent administration ofjustice."
See id. But cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
230
See Willing, supra note 203, at IA (quoting former federal prosecutor Anthony
Pacheco, who also suggested that prosecutors would sometimes "signal to the judges that
they won't appeal").
231
See MANUAL, supra note 39, § 9-27.720 cmt. ("As advocates for the United States,
prosecutors should be prepared to argue concerning those adjustments (and, if necessary,
departures allowed by the guidelines) in order to arrive at a final result which adequately
and accurately describes the defendant's conduct of offense, criminal history, and other
factors related to sentencing.").
232 Id. § 9-27.730 cmt.
233
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-3.9 (b) (iii) (suggesting that prosecutors consider if the authorized punishment fits the crime when charging the defendant).
234
But see United States v. Green, Nos. CR. A. 02-10054-WGY, CR. A. 01-10469-WGY,
CR. A. 99-10066-WGY, 2004 WL 1381101, at *32 (D. Mass. June 18, 2004) (arguing that
"the ways in which the Guidelines regime have transferred the power of sentencing to the
Department add up to a joining of the power to prosecute and the power to sentence in
one branch of government").
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depart if a defendant provides "substantial" assistance. 23 5 Ethical
guidelines also require a prosecutor to consider the relationship between the crime and the punishment. This suggests, at a minimum,
that she has a duty not to contest a departure that would result in a
more 'just" sentence, given the defendant's culpability. While ajudge
may still deviate from a sentence agreed to in a plea bargain-as
Judge Patterson did in the United Nations shooter case 2 6-the Feeney Amendment reporting requirements raise the possibility that a
judge's decision to downwardly depart could be costly and ultimately
237
ineffective due to the de novo review of the departure.
235 See, e.g., Freed, supra note 159, at 1710-11 (suggesting that the Sentencing Commission "[c]ntirely on its own prerogative ...inserted the requirement of a government motion as a prerequisite to a judicial decision to reduce a nonmandatory sentence"); see also
id. at 1711 n.162 (listing cases in which courts required government motions to depart
before it would downwardly depart).
2-36 See Patricia Hurtado, UN Shooter Sentenced to 27 Months in Prison, NEWSDAY, Oct. 21,
2003, at AI6.
In showing ... [a] postal worker who fired shots at the United Nations to
protest human rights abuses in North Korea .. .leniency, [U.S. District
Judge Robert] Patterson yesterday blasted Congress for limiting or "squeezing" federal judges by not giving them the leeway they previously had to
stray from the strict federal sentencing guidelines. Patterson also addressed
some media reports that criticized his view of the case.
"On the one hand, we must sentence in accordance with the law,
yet.., we must render a fair and just sentcnce based on the uniquc facts
with which we are sometimes confronted," Patterson said.
Id. Eastern District of New YorkJudge Sterling Johnson, Jr. has publicly flaunted the Feeney Amendment by sealing presentencing reports, plea agreements, and any other relevant
sentencing documents in any case before him. See Green, 2004 WL 1381101, at *14 (citing
Amended Admin. Order 2004-04, In re Sealing of All Pre-Sentence Reports, Plea Agreements and All Other Relevant Sentencing Documents for All Criminal Cases Pending
Before the Honorable Sterling Johnson, Jr. (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://
www.nyed.uscourts.gov/adminorder04-04.pdf). His colleague Jack Weinstein has "ordered
videotaping of all sentencing hearings due to the Feeney Amendment's requirement that
appellate courts conduct de novo review of a district court's departure from the Guidelines." Id. at 68-69 (citing In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)).
237
See Ashcrofi Overreaches, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 12, 2003, at 14 ("Federal
Judge James Rosenbaum of Minnesota has been harassed by sentencing hawks on the
House Judiciary Committee, who consider him too lenient."). But see United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah 2003) (Cassell, J.) ("[T]his court wishes to
observe that it is not concerned about close scrutiny of its downward (or upward) departure decisions by Congress, the public, or otherwise."); Willing, supra note 203, at IA.
While one can argue that all federal judges should be as bold as Judge Cassell, this aspirational standard means little to an attorney or a defendant standing before a timid judge.
This statement may appear a bit schizophrenic as federal prosecutors are responsible
for reporting downwardly departing judges under the PROTECT Act. See MANUAL,supra
note 39, § 9-2.170(B). Nevertheless, downward departures that the government did not
request provide one criteria in several categories of adverse sentencing decisions that the
prosecutor is required to report. See, e.g., id. (listing categories). The Ashcroft Memorandum's strictures on requesting or acceding to downward departures could thus conceivably
require a prosecutor to report a judge under the PROTECT Act as implemented in the
U.S. Attorney's Manual. See id.; Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 6.
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As an administrator ofjustice, the prosecutor has a responsibility
to aid in its realization. This duty certainly includes effective and eloquent advocacy on behalf of the government she represents. But it
also requires a concomitant recognition that she must weigh the facts
of each case and in some instances acknowledge that a more just result would occur if the judge departed from the Sentencing Guidelines. The Ashcroft Memorandum does not permit a prosecutor to
"seek justice" where justice demands a downward departure. 238
C.

A Brief Response to the 'Justice Requires Uniformity"
Argument

Some suggest that any potential disparity across jurisdictions is a
greater injustice than restricting prosecutorial discretion or curtailing
judges' abilities to consider mitigating factors in sentencing. 239 They
argue that prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, "l[t] the length of time a
person spent in prison appeared to depend on 'what the judge ate for
breakfast' on the day of sentencing, on which judge you got, or on
other factors that should not have made a difference to the length of
the sentence. '240 The Ashcroft Memorandum implicitly supports this
24
view. '
Others take a more nuanced view. Professor Albert Alschuler describes the "movement from individualized to aggregated sentences"
and argues that inflexible sentencing guidelines are "a backward step
238 Prosecutors are permitted to seek upward departures as warranted, though the procedures for upwardly departing post-Blakely are still uncertain as of this writing. Enhancing
a sentence may be necessary for a more just result in some cases. By arguing for enhanced
sentences for more egregious defendants and decreased sentences for less-culpable defendants, prosecutors can help make rational and appropriate distinctions between offenders. Such variances should be amenable to the Sentencing Commission, which
contemplated a twenty percent departure rate from the Guidelines. See generally 149 CONG.
REc. S6711-12 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that judges

depart from the Guidelines over the objection of the government slightly more than ten
percent of the time). This observation rebuts arguments that the Commission and Congress did not intend to let officials responsible for sentencing federal defendants deviate
from the Guidelines.
239
See, e.g., CriminalJustice Oversight Subcommittee Hearingon "Oversight of the United States
Sentencing Commission: Are the Guidelines Being Followed?": Hearing Before the Senate Judiciay
Comm. CriminalJustice Oversight Subcomm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT. REP. 317, 317 (2003).
240
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2554 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing studies finding that prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, "punishments for
identical crimes in the Second Circuit ranged from 3 to 20 years' imprisonment and that
sentences varied depending upon religion, gender of the defendant, and race of the defendant" (citations omitted)).

241

See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7 ("Fundamental fairness requires

that all defendants prosecuted in the federal criminal justice system be subject to the same
standards and treated in a consistent manner.").
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in the search for just criminal punishments. '242 He suggests that uniformity should not be the only goal of the sentencing system. 243 For
instance, a regime that prescribed five-year terms for everything from
littering to murder would be uniform, but would not reflect most conceptions of equaljustice. 244 Instead, "[e] quality does not mean sameness; the term more commonly refers to the consistent application of
a comprehensible principle or mix of principles to different cases.
Excessive aggregation-treating unlike cases alike-can violate rather
245
than promote the principle of equality.
The Justice Department should trust its prosecutors to consider
facts more nuanced than the broadly sketched elements of an offense
rather than focusing on "provable uniformity. ' 2 4 6 Provable uniformity
should take a backseat to actual uniformity, which requires individual
prosecutors abiding by ethical mandates to weigh mitigating circum2 47
stances reflected in the "seriousness of the defendant's conduct,"
but not captured by the "facts of the case." 248 Moreover, a focus on
actual uniformity is reflected in the Sentencing Reform Act, which
spawned the Sentencing Guidelines and sought to prevent "unwarranted disparities," in sentencing. 249 Individualized justice does not
subvert Congressional intent.
Alschuler himself recognizes that "widespread injustice is more to
[However, t]he injustice that
be deplored than isolated injustice ....
242

See Alschuler, supra note 18, at 902. Alschuler suggests that the Guidelines "dehu-

manized the sentencing process" by focusing on "social harm" to the exclusion of the individual defendant's culpability. Id. at 903.
24'3
Id. at 916.
244

Id.

Id.
One achieves provable uniformity by ensuring that Defendant A, tried in Leftland
by Lucy Liberal and convicted of federal Crime X, serves the same amount of time as
Defendant B, tried in Rightville by Cathy Conservative, also convicted of Crime X. Actual
uniformity contemplates that prosecutors may recognize differences between the relative
culpability of Defendant A and Defendant B that are not reflected entirely by the elements
of the crime and may appropriately argue that they should receive different sentences.
247
Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 70, at 422.
248
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1. This point is one place where the
connotations of the Ashcroft Memoranda and Thornburgh Memoranda diverge. See supra
Part ll.B.
249
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) (2000) (admonishingjudges to "avoid unwarranted disparities"); 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b) (1) (B) (2000) (requiring the Sentencing Commission to
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of general sentencing practices
); 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2000) (explaining that Sentencing Commission duties include "providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities"). Finally, courts should impose a sentence that is "sufficient, but not greater than
necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
245

246
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occurs in a single case is not diminished because it does not occur in
others, nor is it diminished by the fact that it makes only a ripple in
statistical patterns." ' 25°1 All districts will have a few "outlier" cases demonstrating a clear disparity between the defendant's actual culpability
and the charges he could face or the sentence to which he could be
exposed. In such cases, the Attorney General should trust prosecutors
to abide by their ethical mandates and recognize mitigating circumstances not fully captured in the statutory elements provable in a par2 51
ticular case.
This model necessarily requires that each U.S. Attorney exercise
the same degree of care in selecting prosecutors that James Comey
suggested he used when he spoke to the 2003 Southern District of
New York summer interns. 252 It also requires the Justice Department
to trust these selected men and women to faithfully carry out their
duties to the U.S. Government, to abide by the ethical mandates that
govern their behavior, and to aspire to their larger and grander duty
to seek justice. Finally, of course, it requires that individual prosecutors themselves remain faithful to their duty to seek justice.
Thus, prosecutors need not be required to "charge and pursue
the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case" to ensure that defendants are treated
consistently.2 53 The Justice Department could achieve actual uniformity by permitting prosecutors to recognize the outlier cases and treat
them accordingly. The Attorney General should not force prosecutors to "squeeze fairness" 254 into the document defining their discre250

Alschuler, supra note 18, at 905.
Of course, recognizing that each jurisdiction will have "outlier" cases does not preclude review of those cases to ensure that defendant characteristics such as race, gender,
and class do not impermissibly correlate with prosecutorial clemency.
252
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
253
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 1.
254
See Hechler, supranote 15, at 25. (quoting Zachary Carter, former U.S. Attorney for
the Eastern District of New York, who believed that "U.S. attorneys [could still] squeeze
fairness into these policies," as the memo "makes an attempt to constrict discretion, but it
doesn't do so absolutely"). Unfortunately, individual attorneys may fail to recognize their
potential ability-and possible ethical duty-to "squeeze fairness" out of the Ashcroft
Memorandum. Conversely, the Ashcroft Memorandum might not reduce the supposed
disparities that it was intended to quell. In fact, the Memorandum could enhance the
disparities if some attorneys believe that the current ethos militates against permitting any
prosecution or sentencing less than the maximum. If the same attorneys who would have
chosen to overtly pursue a lesser offense in a given case figure out how to covertly do so by
reading in some flexibility, they may strain against the Ashcroft Memorandum's requirements. See id. (noting that "the notion of what is a readily provable offense is highly subjective" (quoting Zachary Carter) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thornburg remarks,
however, that loyalty would lead most U.S. Attorneys to cooperate, but that every Attorney
General still fires several who won't "take orders." See id. Regardless of whether prosecutors could "get away" with reading flexibility into the Ashcroft Memorandum, the fact that
a federal prosecutor might have to subvert her boss's directives to fulfill her duty to "seek
justice" is deeply troubling.
251
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tion, but rather should encourage prosecutors to abide by the ethical
' '255
mandates that guide their responsibilities as "minister [s] ofjustice.
D.

If Uniformity is Necessary, Why Make an Exception for
Fast-Track Programs?

One approved exception to the Ashcroft Memorandum's requirement that every attorney seek and pursue the highest possible charge
is the "fast-track" program. The fast-track program is "an expedited
disposition program whereby the Government agrees to charge less
than the most serious, readily provable offense" 256 that is intended to
relieve congestion in U.S. Attorney's offices and the courts. 25 7 Fasttrack programs provide "an offer of extraordinary sentence reductions
to defendants willing to plead guilty pre-indictment to an information. '258 For instance, the Southern District of California offers lowlevel narcotics offenders caught crossing the Mexican-American bor2 59
der a substantial sentence reduction in exchange for a guilty plea.
While fast-track programs can be viewed as an imperfect compromise necessary to address an overburdened judiciary,260 they unques255
256

See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 3-1.2(b).
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 3; see also PROTECT Act § 401 (in) (2) (B),

117 Stat 650, 675 (2003).
257
See United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995).
258
See Frank 0. Bowman, IllI&Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An EmpiricalAnalysis of
DecliningFederalDrug Sentences Including Datafrom the District Level, 87 IowA L. REv. 477, 550

(2002).
259
Id. Defendants who pleaded guilty under this fast-track program usually received a
seven-level downward departure. See id. This departure may have been so appealing as to
tempt defendants who were innocent to plead guilty and avoid the possibility of a much

longer sentence. While there is nothing unconstitutional about this, see North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970), it is nonetheless troubling. See generally Stephanos Pibas,
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-LawValues and CriminalProcedure: The Case of Alford and
Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. Rev. 1361 (2003) (arguing that, in criminal Justice,
substance is too often divorced from procedure). Fast-track programs, however, are now
limited to-at most-a four level downward departure. See PROTECT Act
§ 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003); Memorandum Regarding Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition or Fast-Track Prosecution Program in a
District, from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All United States Attorneys 1 (Sept. 22,
2003) [hereinafter Fast-Track Memorandum], available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cddO2b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/FasttrackAGrequire
ments.pdf.
260
Fast-track programs can, however, prevent defendants from escaping punishment
entirely on speedy trial grounds if the system is too overburdened to try them in a timely
manner. (Thanks to Professor Stephen F. Smith for this point.) Nevertheless,
prosecutorial resources will be strained by the Ashcroft Memorandum's charging requirements, and these requirements will heighten the sentencing disparity between the "lucky"
defendant in ajurisdiction with a fast-track program for his crime and the "unlucky" defendant without the fast-track windfall.
Further, Defendants will soon learn that the Ashcroft Memorandum curtails a prosecutor's discretion to give them leniency in a plea bargain. This will likely result in more
trials, which will use more prosecutorial and judicial resources, which will result in a
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tionably undercut the proffered purpose of the Ashcroft
Memorandum: "to ensure that all federal criminal cases are prosecuted according to the same standards. '26' The PROTECT Act did
limit the availability of these programs, 26 2 yet they are still allowed if
the judicial and prosecutorial resources of the district would be too
strained by the number of a particular category of cases.2 63 Permitting
fast-track programs undermines the claim that "[f]undamental fairness requires that all defendants prosecuted in the federal criminal
justice system be subject to the same standards and treated in a consistent manner." 2 4 Furthermore, altering charging decisions solely to
relieve pressure on an overburdened system but forbidding prosecutors to deviate when injustice would result risks transforming prosecutors into bureaucrats more concerned with administrative efficiency
than justice.
E.

The Potential Impact of Blakely v. Washington

In Blakely v. Washingion,265 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the State of Washington's sentencing guidelines. In its June 24,
2004 opinion, the Court stated that the Washington guidelines unconstitutionally permitted a judge to enhance a defendant's sentence
above the statutory maximum of the standard range because thejudge
made a factual finding that he acted with "deliberate cruelty." 266 PreBlakely, for a court to use information to increase the defendant's sentence, the government needed only to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant's conduct fit into certain enhancement categories or that he committed additional crimes-regardless
of whether he had been charged with or convicted by ajury for those
crimes. 26 7 The Court expressly refused to decide whether its holding
implicated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.2 68 After Blakely, however, the component of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that permits judges to find facts that increase the defendant's maximum
greater need for fast-track programs, which will, in the end, possibly result in worse disparity than that which allegedly prompted the Attorney General to write the Memorandum.
261
Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
262
See PROTECT Act § 401(m) (2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003).
263
In a memorandum distributed the same day as the Ashcroft Memorandum that is
the subject of this Note, Ashcroft described the requirements for local jurisdictions to dispatch with cases using a fast-track system. See Fast-Track Memorandum, supra note 259, at
1-2. Fast-track programs require authorization from Ashcroft and will only be permitted in
"exceptional circumstances." See id. at 1.
264 Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 12, at 7.
265
542 U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
266
See id. at 2534.
267
See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 (1997).
268
See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9.
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sentence beyond that warranted by the jury's fact finding may be
unconstitutional.

269

Courts, commentators, and Congress have begun debating
Blakely's impact on the federal system. The Supreme Court quickly
granted certiorariand heard oral arguments in United States v. Booker
and United States v. Fanfan on October 4, 2004.270 Whether the five-

Justice Blakely bloc will hold is still being debated as this Note goes to
press. While the Department of Justice (contrary to suggestions in its
Blakely brief 271 ) claimed that Blakely does not apply to the Federal Sen-

tencing Guidelines, 272 the Department nevertheless required its prosecutors to seek waivers of Blakely rights. 2 73 In the Eastern District of
Virginia, Judge Leonie Brinkema refused to accept these waivers until
2 74
a higher court ruled on their constitutionality.
Should the triple punch of Blakely, Booker, and Fanfan invalidate
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, many of the suggested replacements have the potential to shift even more power and discretion to
the prosecutor. 275 For example, most proposals place greater weight
on the charges to determine the sentence; filing charges remains the
exclusive province of the prosecutor. 2 76 Giving prosecutors absolute
269

See United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional); United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir.
2004) (same), cert. granted 73 U.S.L.W. 3073 (U.S. Aug 2, 2004) (No. 04-104); Fanfan v.
United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. June 28, 2004), cert. granted beforejudgment 73 U.S.L.W. 3073, 73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2004) (No. 04-105). But see United
States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Duncan, 381 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.
2004) (same); United States v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); United
States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 345 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (same); United States v.
Pinerio, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004) (same).
270
See Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Calendar For the Session Beginning October 4, 2004, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument calendars/monthlyargumentcaloctober2004.pdf (revised Aug. 23, 2004).
271
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Blakely v. Washington, 524
U.S. -,
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-1632) ("[A] decision invalidating judicial departure authority here could call into question the constitutionality of the federal
Guidelines.").
272
See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James Comey, to All Federal Prosecutors 1 (July 2, 2004), available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law.and-policy/files/dag blakely-memo_7204.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2004);
Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Chris Wray, to All Federal Prosecutors 5,
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and policy/files/
chris_.wray.doj.memo.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
27-1
See Dan Eggen & Jerry Markon, High Court Decision Sows Confusion on Sentencing
Rules, WASH. PosT, July 13, 2004, at A01.
274
See id.
275
See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cataloguing and analyzing
the ways in which legislatures may handle sentencing post-Blakely, noting that a pure
charge offense system "gives tremendous power to prosecutors through their choice of
charges"); Blakely Senate Hearings, supra note 198 (statement of Frank Bowman, Professor
of Law, Indiana University School of Law).
276
See supra Part I.A.
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control over defendants' sentences may present separation of powers
issues 277 and makes it even more vital for prosecutors to abide by their
duty to seekjustice. The Supreme Court of Arizona, for instance, recognized that "a prosecutor is held to a higher standard of conduct
than an ordinary attorney [as her] duty is to seek justice" and held
that "refus [ing] to allege mitigating circumstances which the sentencing judge might consider meddles unduly with judicial power."2 7
New Jersey similarly responded to separation of powers problems by
permitting judicial oversight to "ferret[ ] out arbitrary and capricious
prosecutorial decisions. ' 279 Such concerns about prosecutors' power
and responsibility should guide Congress, the courts, and the Attorney General in drafting new Sentencing Guidelines and prosecutorial
policies more consistent with the prosecutor's duty to seek justice.
The issues addressed in this Note, therefore, remain relevant regardless of the post-Blakely/Booker/Fanfanlandscape. The fact remains
that the Ashcroft Memorandum will still require prosecutors to
"charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case." 2 0 Furthermore, if
any downward departure scheme remains in place (i.e., one which
provides for a "standard" sentence and requires defendants to ask for
downward departures 28 1 ), the Memorandum will still require prosecutors to "not request or accede" to them. 2 1 2 Finally, the ethical duty of
prosecutors to "seek justice" will surely be the same.
CONCLUSION

Prosecutors are uniquely situated to "seek justice" because they
are familiar with the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the
individual cases they prosecute. The Ashcroft Memorandum unduly
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constrains a prosecutor's discretion to charge a lesser offense that
more fairly reflects a defendant's individual culpability. This directive
can place a prosecutor in an untenable position: she must either respect the ethical precepts handed down by the common law, promulgated in the Manual, and passed by the American Bar Association, or
abide by the Ashcroft Memorandum.
More importantly, perhaps, requiring a prosecutor to uniformly
oppose downward departures is a clear movement away from the prosecutor's role as an administrator of justice. The Sentencing Guidelines were properly and necessarily developed to address generalities
and cannot reflect the precise culpability of a defendant without permitting the flexibility of upward or downward departures in certain
cases. The countervailing consideration of uniformity does not mitigate the discretion-stripping effected by the Ashcroft Memorandum,
nor does it address or obviate the individual prosecutor's duty to seek
justice.
The Supreme Court recognized that "we must have assurance
that those who would wield [prosecutorial] power will be guided
solely by their sense of public responsibility for the attainment of justice." 28 3 Unfortunately, the Ashcroft Memorandum demands that federal prosecutors sacrifice individualized justice upon the altar of
uniformity. By doing so, it threatens to turn justice into nothing more
than the "fortuitous residue of the process in which the prosecutor
participates" rather than the guiding principle for every aspect of her
284
job.

28-

284

Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987).
Melilli, supra note 1, at 702.

